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PERIODIC PAYMENT OF DAMAGES FOR
PERSONAL INJURY
Marcus L. Plant*
[Editor's Note: The editors regret to inform our readers of the death
of Professor Plant subsequent to his completion of this, his last, article.
We deeply mourn the loss of this great teacher and scholar.]
It is a high privilege and great pleasure to write in an issue of the
Louisiana Law Review honoring Professor Wex S. Malone. Each of his
many admirers has his or her own special reason to be grateful for the
opportunity of knowing him, working with him as a colleague, or being
under his tutelage as a student. One of the many reasons I have long
been a devotee of Professor Malone is that in his distinguished career
as an academician and as a leader in the Association of American Law
Schools and the American Law Institute, he has been a dynamic force
for the modernization and improvement of law and legal education. His
influence ha been especially notable in that body of ideas, principles and
doctrines we call the law of torts.' For this reason, I have chosen to write
briefly on a cognate aspect of torts, one which is evolving rapidly and
may well constitute the wave of the future. Recent developments in this
area have the potential to bring about important changes in the operation
of the legal system governing personal injuries, and perhaps to revolu-
tionize the system.
The basic concept of periodic payment of monetary reparation for
personal injury is not new. In some European countries it has long been
an established practice.2 In this country, it is characteristic of workers'
compensation laws.3 Installment payment of judgments by defendants of
limited means has existed for decades." The aspect of periodic payment
*of damages that is new is the rapidly increasing use of this concept by
imaginative lawyers and their creative consultants in an effort to solve
the practical problems brought about by the explosion of litigation in cer-
tain areas, notably products liability and medical malpractice.
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. For examples of the influence of his thought with respect to the duty aspect of
the negligence action and the resulting reduction of the confusion associated with the doc-
trine of "proximate cause," see Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 550, 256
So. 2d 620, 623 (1972); Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American
Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,
9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
2. Stone, Separate Trials, Declaratory Rulings and Installment Damages: A Comparative
Study, 35 TUL. L. REV. 597, 601 (1961).
3. 3 A. LARSON, THE 'LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 82.70-82.72 (1983).
4. Woodbridge, Installment Payment of Judgments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 357, 366-88
(1941).
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Surprisingly, the academic law journals have neglected the subject.5
There is a small body of literature in publications directed specifically
at the insurance industry or the trial bar,' and some lawyers with special
sophistication in personal injury litigation are cognizant of the usefulness
of the periodic payment technique. But a much broader segment of the
personal injury bar ought to be acquainted with the available possibilities
for covering an injured person's future needs at an efficient societal cost.
Furthermore, even the most sophisticated members of the bar need
the assistance of experts in the fields of investment, insurance, money
management, and finance in devising the plan or plans best suited to the
needs of particular clients. A lawyer's expertise, focused as it is on
establishing liability and safeguarding the client's legal rights, may well
need to be supplemented when he seeks to develop the most effective and
protective arrangement for his injured client's future. He may need to
work with financial, actuarial, and other professional experts in his client's
behalf. A conscientious lawyer's duty does not end with a signed settle-
ment or with the expiration of the delays for appeal after verdict and
judgment have been entered.
The case in which the periodic payment mechanism has most
frequently been used is one in which: (1) there is a catastrophic personal
injury, with physical results and considerable expense likely to persist for
a lengthy period or for the life of the unfortunate victim, and (2) liability
is either admitted or likely to be established. Under these circumstances,
the traditional system of payment of a lump sum of money to the injured
person may be costly and unwise for the claimant, unjust to the defen-
dant, and burdensome for the public. Conversely, a periodic payment ar-
rangement may be beneficial, financially and otherwise, to the claimant,
fair to the defendant, and wise from the standpoint of the public's in-
terest.
The first notable characteristic of a plan for periodic payment of
damages is its flexibility. In contrast to the stark rigidity of a fixed sum
damage payment, a plan for periodic payment can be tailored and adapted
in detail, almost without limit, to meet the particular, and sometimes
unique, needs and wishes of those involved. The interested parties include
the injured claimant, his lawyer, his spouse, his children (whose needs
will change as time passes), his physicians and nurses, his physical,
5. For a perceptive discussion, see Comment, Variable Periodic Payments of Damages:
An Alternative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 IowA L. REV. 138 (1978).
6. For thorough discussions of the subject, see Elligett, The Periodic Payment of
Judgments, 46 INS. CouNs. J. 130 (1979); Hindert, Periodic Payment of Personal Injury
Damages, 31 FED'W OF INS. CouNs. Q. 3 (1980); Hindert & Hindert, New Rules for an
Old Game: An Evaluation of the Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act, 15 INT'L
Soc'Y OF BARRERs Q. 359 (1980). See also Choulos, Structured Settlements: Cure or Curse?,
16 TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 73; Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A.
J. 1527 (1980); McGinn, Structuring Settlements, 18 TRIAL, June 1982, at 58.
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psychological or occupational therapists, the defendant, his insurer, and
anyone else affected by the injury or involved in its resulting problems.
It is standard practice under such plans to provide for the payment
of a lump sum to cover all damages accrued at the time of settlement.
These damages would include past medical expenses, lost earnings to date,
past pain and suffering, loss of consortium to date, and any other damages
that might already have accrued, such as the cost of restructuring the
claimant's home or the provision of a specially equipped van for transpor-
tation. It is also common practice under such plans to pay the attorney's
fee at the time of settlement, if that is desired; however, if the attorney
prefers to take the fee in installments over a period of time for tax or
other reasons, his wishes can be accommodated in the plan.
Only the future damages-i.e., those that have not yet accrued-are
covered by periodic payments. These will normally include: (1) medical
expenses, costs of care or custody, and other outlays related to the claim-
ant's physical and mental conditon; (2) economic losses such as wages
or other income reduced or precluded by the injury; and (3) future
noneconomic losses including pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and
loss of normal bodily function. These elements of future damages will
be defrayed by periodic (e.g., monthly) installments of a fixed sum or
a sum which may vary from one time to another under a formula that
takes account of inflationary factors in the national economy. Further,
the plan may provide that an additional, substantial lump sum will be
paid at stipulated intervals or times-for example, at the time or times
that claimant's children reach college age. Finally, the plan may provide
that the payments will continue for a fixed term (e.g., thirty years) and
thereafter until claimant's death, or it may provide that payments will
continue after the claimant's death for an additional period related to
the lifetime of such designated dependents as the claimant's spouse and
children. These suggestions illustrate only a few of the variations and com-
binations that are possible.7
Several advantages in the foregoing system account for its increasing
use in recent years. One of the most attractive, from the claimant's point
of view, is the opportunity for substantial minimization of his federal
income tax. The Internal Revenue Code provides generally that amounts
received as damages for personal injury, either as lump sums or as periodic
payments, are not includible in the taxpayer's gross income.' If, however,
7. For a number of examples, see Krause, supra note 6, at 1529.
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982). It provides:
(a) In general
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions
allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior tax-
able year, gross income does not include-
(2) the amount of any damages received ( . . . whether as lump sums or
as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness.
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the taxpayer receives a lump sum damage award which is invested by him,
the income on the investment is includible in gross income.9 A skillfully
devised periodic payments plan makes it possible to avoid this taxation
through the creation of an annuity or trust arrangement which, while in-
volving neither actual nor constructive receipt by the claimant of the lump
sum settlement, provides for periodic payments comprised of both prin-
cipal from the settlement and investment income. These payments would
be received by the claimant as tort damages free from the federal levy.
The Internal Revenue Act has recently been amended to recognize this
precise type of arrangement.'0
In the case of a severely injured individual in his early or middle
years, the tax savings can be impressive. One experienced practitioner
describes a hypothetical but realistic case in which a thirty-five-year old
male who is completely disabled and has a future life expectancy of thirty-
nine years receives an award or settlement for future damages of
$1,000,000." If he takes it in a lump sum and invests it himself in an
annuity which produces $93,000 annually for his lifetime, his federal in-
come tax liability, with specified assumptions as to medical expenses and
other deductions, will be $18,000 each year. If he enters into a carefully
conceived periodic payment plan which also produces $93,000 annually,
he pays no federal income tax. If he lives his full life expectancy, the
total tax savings under the periodic payment plan would amount to more
than $700,000. Any lawyer who fails to explore tax savings possibilities
of this magnitude is surely failing to perform his full duty to his client.
To accomplish this favorable tax result, however, it is necessary to
arrange a plan under which there is neither actual nor constructive receipt
by the claimant of the funds which will produce the periodic payments.
At the same time, there must be optimal assurance that these funds will
be managed and invested astutely throughout the term of the plan to en-
sure that there will be no interruption in the flow of periodic payments.
In attempting to fashion a plan that accomplishes both of these an-
tagonistic objectives, the claimant's lawyer must not only exercise his own
greatest skill and best professional judgment but must also recognize that
he may require outside expert assistance. Unless he has exceptional
sophistication and expertise in the fields of financial planning, money
management, and income taxation, the attorney would be well advised
to seek such assistance. This does not mean the services of persons who
are merely annuity brokers. It means organizations of professional per-
sons whose sole corporate purpose is the formulation and implementa-
tion of plans for periodic payment of damages. Such entities have
9. Rev. Rul. 29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
10. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), quoted supra note 8; see also Rev. Ruls 313, 1979-41 I.R.B.
8; 220, 1979-30 I.R.B. 5; Rev. Rul. 230, 1977-2 C.B. 214.
11. See Hindert, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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developed in recent years and are meeting a steadily increasing demand
for their services.
Various arrangements are available to accomplish the specific objec-
tives of a particular case. Most involve the payment of the lump sum
or sums by defendant to purchase an annuity or annuities, the use of
a trust, or a combination thereof. Normally, these plans do not rely upon
an unsecured commitment of the defendant-the danger of subsequent
bankruptcy is too great. The annuities are commonly written by one or
more of the reliable and financially secure life insurance companies; these
organizations have had extensive experience in the field, particularly with
respect to so-called "substandard lives," i.e., the lives of persons who
do not have a normal life expectancy. The details of a particular plan
are as infinitely variable as are the circumstances of the parties involved,
and many illustrations are found in the practical literature.'" If carefully
drafted and administered, the financial benefits can be impressive.
Another important private and social benefit of a system of periodic
payment of damages is the avoidance of the danger of dissipation of the
award for purposes other than the maintenance and rehabilitation of the
injured person. Two studies in Michigan have identified this danger as
a very real one. The first, a study of lump sum payments of workers'
comliensation claims, was undertaken by James N. Morgan, Marvin
Snider, and Marian G. Sobel of the Economic Behavior Program of the
Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.' 3 Part of the study
focused on how the recipients of lump sum awards disposed of them.
According to this study, about forty percent of the recipients did not con-
serve the lump sum with a view towards using it to replace lost wages.
Instead, they spent all or part of the award for such matters as payment
of installment debt other than medical bills, payment of the home mort-
gage, purchases of furniture and household appliances, investments in the
recipient's own business, and investments in other business ventures, such
as real estate and stocks. Then, in 1975, the Michigan Law Revision Com-
mission, in its Tenth Annual Report, recommended a statute providing
for deferred damage -payments in cases in which personal injury awards
exceeded $100,000.1" The basis of its recommendation was stated as
follows:
In such cases, the damage award is paid to the plaintiff who very
frequently has little capacity for exercising sound judgment as to
the making of investments with his new found riches. Often too,
12. See authorities cited supra note 6.
13. J. MOROAN, M. SNIDER & M. SOBEL, LUMp SuM REDEMPTION SETTLEMENTS AND
REHABILITATION: A STUDY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MICHIGAN (Institute for Social
Research, Univ. of Mich. 1959).
14. MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMM'N, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT, 1975, at 129, 130 (recom-
mendation concerning deferred damage payments).
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the plaintiff lacks the discipline to conserve those assets to meet
his lifetime needs, particularly where as a result of those injuries
he is unable to support himself by 'normal employment.
Such plaintiffs often find themselves a few years later without
adequate means for their support after having expended or
dissipated the sums which they recovered. Such persons frequently
become public charges requiring the expenditure of public funds
for their future needs for medical expenses, support and
maintenance."3
In addition, other studies have concluded that ninety percent of injured
plaintiffs who receive substantial sums from settlements or other sources
"will have squandered the entire sum within five years, leaving them a
public charge, dependent upon welfare, health care assistance, and the
like."' 6 Under the periodic payment system, individual installments may
still be dissipated by the recipient for other purposes; the bulk of the
award, however, will remain available to carry out its purposes, and the
danger that the injured person will become a public charge is greatly
diminished or virtually eliminated.
From the defendant's point of view, the periodic payments system
is more equitable than the lump sum system in at least one important
situation-the case in which the injured claimant dies prior to the expira-
tion of his life expectancy. To illustrate, assume a case in which damages
are calculated on the basis of a life expectancy of thirty years and.amounts
are included for future medical expenses and for future pain and suffer-
ing. Assume further that that injured person dies at the end of three years.
Under the lump sum payment system, the entire amount of the damages
paid, including the portion for future medical expenses and future pain
and suffering, passes to claimant's successors as a windfall. This result
has been described as "one of the social injustices . . . that we think
should be avoided."" Under a periodic payments plan, the portions of
the payments attributable to future medical expenses and future pain and
suffering could be terminated upon the claimant's death, although all other
installments, including for special purposes (e.g., education) would con-
tinue. Several authorities,' 8 including one bar committee,' 9 have considered
15. Id. at 129.
16. Choulos, supra note 6, at 74.
17. Annuities to Settle Cases, 42 INs. COUNS. J. 367, 377 (1975) (statement of Andy
Collins).
18. Sedgwich & Judge, The Use of Annuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases,
41 INS. COUNS. J. 584 (1974); Thomas, Medical Prophecy and the Single A ward: The Prob-
lem and a Proposal, 1 TULSA L.J. 135, 144 (1964).
19. Special Comm. on Medical Malpractice Ins., Medical Malpractice Committee Report,
48 Wis. B. BULL. 17 (June 1975) (recommendation 6(c)).
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this aspect of the periodic payment system to be one of the strongest
factors supporting it.
The flexibility and other advantages of the periodic payment system
have led to a geometric increase in the number of such arrangements.
One experienced commentator and practitioner in the field has estimated
the dollar value of the settlements or awards obtained in each of three




He predicts that in 1985 the dollar volume will reach $5,000,000,000 or
more.
20
The desirable features of periodic payments plans in settlements have
also prompted interest in their incorporation into judgments in contested
cases. Occasionally, the courts have done this by judicial decision,2" but
the general view has been that the incorporation of periodic payment plans
in judgments involves such a substantial departure from common law prac-
tices that it requires statutory authorization.22 Several states have enacted
statutes providing for the periodic payment of judgments, usually in cases
of small claims23 and medical malpractice cases." In Washington, the
statute applies to any civil action for personal injury.25
In 1977, the general interest in the subject led the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to establish a special commit-
tee to study the matter. The committee was chaired by a distinguished
legal scholar, Roger C. Henderson, then Dean of Arizona State University
College of Law. The committee was asked to draft a statute that would
assist the states in implementing such a system. The result of its efforts
is the Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act approved in 1980.26
A detailed analysis of the Act will not be presented here due to space
limitations, but its salient provisions may be summarized briefly. Its stated
20. Interview with Patrick J. Hindert, President of Benefit Designs, !nc., Cincinnati,
Ohio (Oct. 28, 1983).
21. McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 353 P.2d 760 (1960); M & P Stores v. Taylor,
326 P.2d 804 (Okla. 1955), noted in Note, Judgments: Installment Payments, 11 OKLA.
L. REv. 458 (1958); Note, Damages-Installment Verdict in Tort Action, 12 VAND. L. REv.
490 (1959).
22. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Frankel
v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972). In M & P Stores v. Taylor, 326 P.2d 804 (Okla.
1955), see supra note 21 and accompanying text, the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed
the judgment to stand although it expressed doubts as to its propriety.
23. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 288 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 631.12 (West Supp. 1983-1984); see also Annot. 111 A.L.R. 389, 392 (1937).
24. ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2609 (1983).
25. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.56.240 (Supp. 1983-1984).
26. 14 U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 1980).
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purposes are to alleviate some of the practical problems arising from the
unpredictability of large future losses, to make more precise awards for
future losses, to pay damages as the trier of fact finds they will accrue,
and to assure that damage payments more nearly serve the purposes for
which they are awarded.27
The parties to a contested case may have it tried under the Act by
mutual consent. If there is not mutual consent, one party may move to
have the claim so tried over the objection of the other. If a plaintiff elects
to have his claim tried under the Act, he must show that there is a good
faith claim for future damages in excess of $100,000; if a defendant so
elects he must show that future damages of more than $100,000 are claimed
and that he can provide specified security for future payments. Either
party may object to trying the case under the Act on the ground that
"the purposes of the Act would not be served" by doing so.2"
If a case is tried under the Act and the defendant is found liable,
the jury is to make findings fixing the amount of any past damages and
the amounts of future damages for medical costs, other economic loss,
and noneconomic loss.29 Each of these categories of damages is defined
in the Act.3" Economic loss must be based on the length of time the claim-
ant would have lived but for the injury.3 Damages must be calculated
by the jury without regard to future changes in the earning or purchasing
power of the dollar; the law provides that these factors be taken into
account in the judgment, and the jury must be so advised.3" If the total
of future damages is less than $100,000, the court enters a lump sum
award (at present value) unless claimant specifically requests periodic
installments. 3 If the total of future damages exceeds $100,000, the judg-
ment must first specify the payment of attorney fees in a manner separate
from the future damages payable to the claimant. These fees may be paid
in either a lump sum or installments, as the attorney and client may agree;
in either event, however, the amount to be paid in attorney fees is deducted
from the award of future damages.3 ' Next, all subrogees who have a right
to reimbursement for payments already made (e.g., workers' compensa-
tion payors) are entitled to receive lump sum payments from the award
of future damages. 3 After all such adjustments, if the remainder of the
award of future damages, reduced to present value, is more than $50,000
27. MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 22 (Supp. 1980).
28. Id. § 3, at 24.
29. Id. § 4(a), at 26.
30. Id. § 2, at 23.
31. Id. § 4(b), at 26.
32. Id. § 5, at 27.
33. Id. § 6(2), at 28.
34. Id. § 6(3)(i), at 28.
35. Id. § 6(3)(ii), at 29.
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or, if the remainder is less than $50,000 but the claimants elect periodic
payments, the court shall enter judgment for the future damages, without
present value reduction, payable-in specified installments.3"
When the court enters judgment for periodic installments, each party
held liable is required to post security for the payments within thirty days
after the date on which the judgment is subject to execution and to main-
tain such security in the future.3" This is, of course, a crucial element
of the program. The security must be approved by the court and may
take one or more of several forms of commitment executed by one or
more qualified insurers. Authorized forms of security include a bond, an
annuity contract, evidence of applicable and collectible liability insurance,
one or more agreements guaranteeing payment of the judgment, or "any
other satisfactory form of security. ' ' 38 If satisfactory security is not posted
or maintained, the court must enter a lump sum judgment, 39 and, if the
failure to comply is without good cause or otherwise capricious, a lump
sum judgment for the total amount must be entered without discounting
the payment to present value."0
Future periodic payments must be adjusted to take into account fluc-
tuations in the purchasing power of the dollar."' The index figure used
is based on the rate of discount for United States fifty-two-week treasury
bills. ' This provision enables a judgment debtor or other obligor for
periodic installments to invest the necessary funds in treasury bills to make
the required yearly adjustments. While such treasury bills provide a reliable
accommodation between security and liquidity, the obligor is not limited
to that course if other investments that meet the Act's requirement for
security are deemed more desirable for the purpose.
There are also important provisions governing the effect of the death
of claimant or of other beneficiaries. If the claimant dies, installments
not yet due for medical care, other costs of health care, and noneconomic
loss terminate, but other future installments continue in conformity with
the judgment. Installments payable to a wrongful death beneficiary do
not terminate at his death unless all such recipients are dead; if one or
more survive, the deceased's installments are shared equitably by the sur-
vivors for the respective periods specified for them in the judgment. A
similar provision is made regarding installments due deceased beneficiaries
other than wrongful death beneficiaries.4 3
36. Id. § 6(3)(iv), at 29.
37. Id. § 9(a), (b), at 35.
38. Id. § 8(a), at 33.
39. Id. § 9(b), at 35.
40. Id. § 9(c), at 35.
41. Id. § 7(a), (b), at 31.
42. Id. § 7(c)(1), at 31.
43. Id. § 11, at 38.
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The Model Act contains two alternative approaches to restricting the
assignment of periodic installments (spendthrift provisions). One permits
such assignments only to meet medical and health care costs. The other
permits the assignment of periodic installments for costs of alimony,
maintenance, child care, medical and health care expenses, attorney fees,
and other expenses of litigation incurred in securing the judgment."
Periodic installments of future damages for loss of earnings are exempt
from legal process to the extent that wages or earnings are exempt from
such process under state law.4 1
Finally, the parties may "adopt" the Act or any part thereof in a
settlement agreement filed in the proper court, whether or not an action
has been brought, and may provide that one or more sections of the Act
shall apply. The court may then enter a consent judgment adopting the
specified sections of the Act."6
Apart from the policy considerations mentioned above, constitutional
questions will surely be raised if the Model Periodic Payment of Judgments
Act or a similar statute is enacted. Would such a statute be in violation
of state or federal constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws, due process of law, or jury trial? Three state supreme courts
have expressed opinions on these issues in cases involving medical malprac-
tice legislation that required periodic payment of judgments under specified
circumstances. 7
In State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,' 4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had before it a provision requiring that the portion of an award for future
medical expenses over $25,000 be paid to a future medical expense fund
and disbursed for those expenses in periodic installments until the amount
was exhausted or the patient died. The court held the statute constitu-
tional with a brief statement that the procedure was obviously intended
for the benefit of claimants with substantial injuries requiring long-term
treatment and, as such, was neither unreasonable nor a denial of equal
protection of the law.' 9
In New Hampshire, the supreme court reviewed the constitutionality
of that state's legislation relating to medical malpractice and found the
entire statutory scheme unconstitutional. The provision permitting trial
courts to order periodic payment of damages in an appropriate case was
44. Id. § 13, at 41.
45. Id. § 14, at 42.
46. Id. § 15, at 42.
47. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); State ex rel. Strykowski
v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
48. 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
49. 81 Wis. 2d at 506-12, 261 N.W.2d at 441-44.
50. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
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struck down on the ground that it "unreasonably discriminates in favor
of health care defendants and unduly burdens seriously injured malprac-
tice plaintiffs."" The court emphasized that the statute did not provide
for interest payments on amounts withheld, that it gave a windfall benefit
to the defendant if the claimant died, that it denied the plaintiff the right
to dispose of the funds embodied in the judgment, and that it applied
only to claimants whose future damages exceeded $50,000 and thus "re-
quires one class to shoulder the burden inherent in a periodic payments
scheme from which the general public benefits." 2
Finally, the California Supreme Court, in a case involving negligent
medical care, directed its attention to the periodic payment of judgments. 3
The statute provided that in a malpractice action against a health care
provider in which the award for future damages exceeded $50,000, the
trial court, at the request of either party, was required to enter a judg-
ment ordering periodic payment of the future damages in excess of $50,000.
Elaborate provisions covered the details of administration of the award,
including maintenance of security and modification of the judgment in
case of the death of the judgment creditor. Plaintiff had obtained a jury
verdict for $198,000, including future damages, and defendant moved that
the court enter a judgment providing for the periodic payment of future
damages in excess of $50,000. The motion was denied by the trial court,
which held the statute violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The supreme court affirmed
four to three.
The majority opinion is an unusual one. After tracing the legislative
history of the statute during the "medical malpractice crisis," a substan-
tial portion of the opinion consists of argumentative responses to prop-
ositions advanced by defendants and amicus curiae in support of the
statute." The ultimate decision, however, was based on one very narrow
51. 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838.
52. 120 N.H. at 944, 424 A.2d at 838.
53. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1983).
54. In the course of these remarks, the majority expressed serious misgivings about
the "pragmatic results" of the statute in that (1) it allowed the insurer to retain the use
of the future damages portion of the award thus depriving the claimant of "the opportunity
to invest the retained sums in high yield long-term accounts and to obtain earnings on such
accounts commensurate with the rate of inflation," 660 P.2d at 834, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
376; (2) it permitted the insurer to retain outright any portion of the future damages award
which might not have been paid out at the time of the victim's death, except as to future
earnings if the victim left dependents, 660 P.2d at 834, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 376. Defendant's
argument that the periodic payment system would protect against dissipation of the award
was dismissed almost summarily with one sentence of 56 words which said in effect: "The
claimant should be allowed to take care of himself." 660 P.2d at 836, 190 Cal. Rptr. 378.
A paragraph was devoted to defendant's argument that if the victim receives the lump sum
and invests it he will pay tax on the income, a tax which could be avoided if the periodic
1984l 1337
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
ground-that the legislature had assumed that a periodic payments system
would bring a reduction of medical malpractice insurance premiums paid
by hospitals and that this reduction would result in a reduction in the
cost of medical care, whereas in fact total medical care costs had risen
since enactment of the statute. The majority opinion cites studies show-
ing that prior to the statute the cost of $1,000,000 malpractice coverage
for each hospital bed was roughly four dollars per day and that five years
later such costs amounted to three dollars per day. Meanwhile, over
roughly the same period of time, general hospital costs had risen from
$217 per day to $620 per day. On this basis, the court concluded:
It is obvious . . . that experience since 1975 has demonstrated
the fallacy of the Legislature's assumption that the reduction of
malpractice premiums paid by hospitals would result in a mean-
ingful containment of hospital costs. Since section 667.7 was
premised on that assumption, the classification of malpractice vic-
tims made therein constitutes a denial of equal protection of the
law under the foregoing standard."
The dissenting opinion of Justice Kaus, joined by Justices Broussard
and Feinberg, presents a strong and persuasive analysis demonstrating that
a system of periodic payment of damages does not offend the equal pro-
tection guarantees of either the state or federal constitutions. They
acknowledged that there might be a constitutional question with respect
to the right to jury trial, but it .seemed correctable. Two brief statements
summarize the minority's disagreement with the majority's approach:
To begin with, it is-to say the least-a novel proposition that
a statute is to be declared unconstitutional simply because it does
not accomplish all that the enacting Legislature may have hoped
for ...
Second ..... .[a]lthough the Legislature may have viewed the
containment of total medical costs as an incidental benefit of
limiting malpractice insurance costs, its primary goal was related
directly to the reduction of insurance costs and insurance premiums
themselves."
At the time of this writing, the case is still before the court on an order
of rehearing granted June 15, 1983.
payments include both principal and income derived from investment of the judgment funds.
The court brushed this argument aside on the apparent misunderstanding of the effect of
Revenue Ruling 220, 1979-2 C.B. 74, that if the claimant received a combination of prin-
cipal and interest he was necessarily receiving the economic benefit of the award and the
exemption would not apply. It seems obvious that the possible tax saving aspects of the
periodic payments system were not understood. The majority opinion is a strange one even
for the California Supreme Court.
55. 660 P.2d at 840-41, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
56. 660 P.2d at 842, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
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It appears that the Model Act would not run afoul of these constitu-
tional limitations, however. It would not be limited to actions involving
medical malpractice, avoiding claims that it subjects a particular category
of plaintiffs or defendants to special treatment. It would not disturb the
jury's ultimate authority to determine the quantum of damages; it regulates
only the administration of the verdict after the jury has performed its
function. It does discriminate between plaintiffs whose judgments for
future damages exceed the threshold figure of $100,000 and plaintiffs
whose judgments for future damages do not exceed that amount. However,
justification for that kind of discrimination seems well established by the
long-standing and widespread practice of providing different procedural
and jurisdictional standards in litigation based upon the amount of the
claims or damages involved. Furthermore, the interest of the public in
protecting itself from the potential burden of catastrophically injured per-
sons would seem to furnish adequate grounds for distinguishing between
judgment creditors above and below the $100,000 mark. Thus, it would
seem that the danger of constitutional infirmity in the Act is not great
enough to deter its adoption.
The general rationale of the Act was well summarized by Dean
Henderson at the time of its promulgation." Since then, however, it has
not made much progress toward adoption. The most likely reason is that
it immediately received a double "bath of ice water"" from important
sources. One was from representatives of the insurance industry;" the other
was from Philip H. Corboy, past chairman of the American Bar Associa-
tion's section on litigation."' The writer has been advised that the prin-
cipal reason for lack of support by the insurance industry is that group's
inability or unwillingness to issue the type of annuity or other security
mechanism that would take account of fluctuations in the purchasing power
of the dollar in calculating the annual installment payments. However,
it is understood that the representative of one of the largest commercial
banks in the country advised the drafting committee that annuity con-
tracts that included such an adjustable feature were entirely feasible and
that his bank could and would issue them."
Mr. Corboy's statement of his objections was characteristically pungent
and eloquent. As a highly respected leader of that branch of the trial
bar devoted to protecting the rights of the injured, his views are entitled
57. Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 735 (1980).
58. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 508 (4th ed. 1971).
59. Interview with William J. Pierce, Executive Director of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Dec. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Interview
with Pierce].
60. Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A.
J. 1524 (1980).
61. Interview with Pierce, supra note 59.
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to full hearing and thoughtful appraisal, but they ought not to foreclose
further consideration of the Act. Some of the objections he raises could
probably be alleviated or even eliminated by compromise. However, the
basic theme of his argument is that the courts ought not to be vested
with the authority to impose a periodic payment plan against the will
of either of the parties or their attorneys. This position is not tenable.
In light of litigation developments in recent decades, the public interest
is of such importance that it should be preeminent.
It is understandable that a proposal of such significant and far
reaching change in the personal injury damage system would generate
strong reactions on both sides of the litigation table. But just as war is
too important to be left to the generals, so the improvement of this area
of the judicial process ought not to be blocked by the opposition of those
whose views are likely to be deeply colored by their personal and profes-
sional interests.
Similar situations have arisen in the past. The inauguration of the
workers' compensation system was strenuously opposed by those whose
personal interests would be adversely affected by reformation of the system
of compensation for industrial injury. 2 Introduction of the comparative
negligence concept into tort law was delayed for decades by those having
a vested interest in the original contributory negligence defense; it was
labeled an unworkable idea, although systems of comparative negligence
had been in successful operation in the Federal Employers' Liability Act63
and in Wisconsin for decades."' Today, however, many states have adopted
comparative negligence, by statute or judicial decision." No-fault
automobile insurance is still the target of strenuous constitutional attacks,
although it is surviving them."
Progress comes slowly in the law, but it does come. In the area of
periodic payment of judgments it is to be hoped that it will come more
rapidly than some of the improvements of the past.
62. W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 27-52 (1936); 1 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 3, § 5.20.
63. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
64. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
65. AM. JUR. 2D NEW Topic SERV. Comparative Negligence (1977).
66. For a most penetrating and thorough analysis of the subject, see King, Constitu-
tionality of No Fault Jurisprudence, 1982 UTAH. L. REV. 797.
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